By his own account, nevertheless, he saved very much abreast of developments. That month, he wrote in 2007, he had directed his counterterrorism unit to evaluate old files—and thus took part of the credit for the “discovery” that Mihdhar and Hazmi may be in the United States. To be no truth to allegations made after 9-11 that several of the terrorists, together ixel 3 frisbee backgrounds with Atta, drank alcohol to excess. Lehman’s clear reminiscence, although, is that Atta and Shehhi were keen on a beer on the end of the day. “Two, possibly, however they never—ever— overindulged.” IN EARLY AUGUST, the diligent Ziad Jarrah was awarded his Private Pilot License. He headed back to Germany in the fall to spend several weeks together with his girlfriend, Aysel.
A variety of Saudi o cials, a pleasant intelligence service informed the CIA nicely earlier than September 11, used bin Laden’s image as the display saver on their o ce computers. Might nonetheless be alive, had not in spite of everything died on 9/11 and would turn up at her door as he had within the past—with presents and an apologetic grin. A packet Khalid al-Mihdhar had hoped would attain his wife, Hoda, in Yemen had additionally ended up with the FBI. A letter in it, despatched with a financial institution card for an account containing some $10,000, expressed his love for her and their daughter and his need for her to have the money. He himself, although, apparently placed a call to his father in Cairo on September 9.
He rst stated that someone as a result of arrive from overseas would be paying for his onward travel, then that another “someone” was waiting for him in Arrivals. Secondary inspector José Meléndez-Pérez noted, too, that the subject was belligerent. “He started pointing his nger … Whatever he was saying was in a loud voice—like ‘I am in charge—you’re not going to do anything to me. This was the one occasion, after a sequence of ine ciencies involving the terrorists, that an alert INS o cial had really accomplished his job. KSM was to admit underneath interrogation that the suspect had certainly been sent to the States to hitch the terrorist staff —to “round out the number of hijackers.” It is rational to think that, however for the inspector’s acumen, there would have been ve somewhat than 4 hijackers aboard United Flight ninety three. With Kahtani’s further muscle—Meléndez-Pérez remembered him as having seemed trim, “like a soldier”—they might have been higher able to withstand the passengers’ attempt to retake the cockpit.
Lack of readiness aside, there was a cogent new cause not to rush matters. Twentynine-year-old Hani Hanjour, the son of a well-to-do family in the Saudi city of Ta’if, already had ying quali cations. After years of journey backwards and forwards to American ight colleges, he had succeeded in getting his industrial pilot’s license. After attempting in useless to get work ying for an airline in his own nation, however, he had resorted to pretending to his household that he had a job as a pilot within the United Arab Emirates. The key to understanding the direction Hanjour now took, though, lies elsewhere. Though described by those who knew him nicely as “frail,” “quiet,” “a little mouse,” he could show another side.
Having EPTEMBER 10, LESS THAN TWENTY-FOUR HOURS BEFORE THE ONSLAUGHT.
